Saturday, October 02, 2004
How the White House Embraced Disputed Iraqi Arms Intelligence
(My guess is this will take-up four full pages in tomorrow's paper.)
Sounds like the NYT helped push the aluminum tube theory.
After the 90-minute session, J. Dennis Hastert, the House speaker, told Fox News that Mr. Cheney had provided new information about unconventional weapons, and Fox went on to report that one source said the new intelligence described "just how dangerously close Saddam Hussein has come to developing a nuclear bomb."....A few days later, on Sept. 8., the lead article on Page 1 of The New York Times gave the first detailed account of the aluminum tubes. The article cited unnamed senior administration officials who insisted that the dimensions, specifications and numbers of tubes sought showed that they were intended for a nuclear weapons program.
As the DOE is used as solid refutation throughout the artile, this stands out:
The Energy Department helped solve the problem. In meetings on the estimate, senior department intelligence officials said that while they still did not believe the tubes were for centrifuges, they nonetheless could agree that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons capability
The response of a Saddam-controlled engineer is defintive refutation?
Why order tubes with such tight tolerances? An Iraqi engineer said they wanted to improve the rocket's accuracy without making major design changes. Design documents and procurement records confirmed his account.
A very long piece without irrefutable conclussions. Sort of like the 19,000-word windmill Howell Raines et al did in summer 2001.
(My guess is this will take-up four full pages in tomorrow's paper.)
Sounds like the NYT helped push the aluminum tube theory.
After the 90-minute session, J. Dennis Hastert, the House speaker, told Fox News that Mr. Cheney had provided new information about unconventional weapons, and Fox went on to report that one source said the new intelligence described "just how dangerously close Saddam Hussein has come to developing a nuclear bomb."....A few days later, on Sept. 8., the lead article on Page 1 of The New York Times gave the first detailed account of the aluminum tubes. The article cited unnamed senior administration officials who insisted that the dimensions, specifications and numbers of tubes sought showed that they were intended for a nuclear weapons program.
As the DOE is used as solid refutation throughout the artile, this stands out:
The Energy Department helped solve the problem. In meetings on the estimate, senior department intelligence officials said that while they still did not believe the tubes were for centrifuges, they nonetheless could agree that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons capability
The response of a Saddam-controlled engineer is defintive refutation?
Why order tubes with such tight tolerances? An Iraqi engineer said they wanted to improve the rocket's accuracy without making major design changes. Design documents and procurement records confirmed his account.
A very long piece without irrefutable conclussions. Sort of like the 19,000-word windmill Howell Raines et al did in summer 2001.
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